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THOMIST NATURAL LAW
JOAQUIN F. GARCIA, C.M.*
N THE Summer 1960 edition of The Catholic Lawyer, Dr. R. D. Lumb,
a Lecturer in Law at the University of Queensland, had an article
entitled "Natural Law - An Unchanging Standard?", in which he con-
sidered the doctrines of two thinkers, St. Thomas and Suarez. It is the
opinion of this writer that as far as Thomist Natural Law is concerned,
Dr. Lumb could have omitted the question mark. It is an unchanging
standard.
Dr. Lumb set himself the task of ascertaining whether the traditional
Thomist system takes into account the variables to be found in any
system of rules or institutions. The Thomist system of law does take
account of the variables but through positive law, through the application
of the universal Natural Law principles to particular changing conditions.
By no means does it replace positive law. Unlike 18th century rationalis-
tic Natural Law which often ignored experience, which often contained
personal, social and political programs, and which often was not Natural
Law at all but positive law under a Natural Law label, Thomist Natural
Law offers the widest scope for positive law and stresses the importance
of experience. St. Thomas says, "The general principles of the natural
law cannot be applied to all men in the same way because of the great
variety of human affairs - hence arises the diversity of positive laws.",,
He says: "The [positive] law .can be rightly changed because of the
changed condition of man, to whom different things are expedient accord-
ing to the difference of his condition."'2
Some positive laws are merely "Conclusions," as St. Thomas called
them, necessary conclusions from Natural Law principles and so are
still part of the Natural Law, as would a law requiring parents to arrange
that their infant children be fed be a conclusion from the Natural Law
precept against taking human life. Other laws are what St. Thomas calls
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1 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-I1, q. 92, art. 2.
2 Id., I-1, q. 97, art. 1.
"Determinations" or "Specifications" of
the Natural Law and are the determining
of precepts left undetermined by the Natu-
ral Law. The Natural Law demands the
protection of human life. When a city es-
tablishes green and red traffic lights and
gives a mandate on them, the ordinance is
partly Natural Law and partly positive law.
The colors could have been reversed. Other
colors could have been used.
In the opinion of the present writer, Dr.
Lumb also could have removed the ques-
tion mark as far as Suarez is concerned,
since his Natural Law is also an "Unchang-
ing Standard." His doctrine allows of no
change since his Natural Law concerns acts
which are intrinsically good or intrinsically
evil and which must be ordered or forbid-
den by God. Suarez says: "God cannot re-
frain from prohibiting those evils which
human reason shows to be evil." 3 He dis-
agrees with Scotus and William of Ockham
on the possibility of a dispensation from
the Ten Commandments.
Law in General
To understand Thomist Natural Law
and particularly these conclusions on its
immutability it may be useful to consider
first the teaching of St. Thomas on law in
general. He defines law as "an ordination
or command of reason for the common
good made by one who has charge of the
community and promulgated."'4 St. Thomas
used this one definition to cover various
types of law, though strictly this definition
pertains to civil law.
In St. Thomas the end or goal is the first
principle or cause in all matters of action
3 DE LEGIBUS, Liber I, Cap. XV, 4. See especially
Liber II, Cap. VI for the natural law doctrine of
Suarez.
4 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-I1, q. 90, art. 4.
8 CATHOLIc LAWYER, WINTER 1962
and it determines a whole series of acts
brought into existence as means for the
attaining of that end or goal. So to attain
certain goals, legislators make laws which
are the means for obtaining those ends.
Since the means-end relation belongs to
reason, law is an act of reason. As St.
Thomas stated it: "The end is the first
principle in all matters of action but it
belongs to the reason to direct to the end.
Since directing to an end is the function of
law - law is an act of reason."5
The intellect-will relation poses a diffi-
cult problem. St. Thomas is an intellectu-
alist, not a voluntarist, and maintains that
a final judgment, called the last practical
judgment, must be made by the reason
which determines the will to a specific act
and so renders the will-act reasonable
though the free will plays a part in the
formulation of that final practical judg-
ment. In the case of voluntarists the intel-
lect proposes a number of means or courses
of action as good for a particular end, but
it makes no final practical judgment. The
final reason for the decision is the will's
determination of itself. No reason can be
given why one means was chosen over the
others except the will itself. In St. Thomas
will inclines a man to what is agreeable
what is an end or goal, and so a good, and
moves the faculties of man to that goal
The will necessarily seeks and consents to
the final goal of man, and, as indicated
freedom is had regarding the means.
In intellectualism the reason why one
means is selected rather than the others is
the last practical judgment of the intellect
which determines the will-act. If in a part
ticular town for instance, a number of per.
sons had been killed in auto accidents and
Id., I-1i, q. 90, art. 1.
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if lawmakers decided to protect human life,
the decision to attain that end would be an
act of the will. The will would move the
reason to consider various means for at-
taining this end. Perhaps red and green
lights or stop signs or the stationing of a
policeman at that place or more severe
penalties for reckless driving might be con-
sidered and all would be declared means.
Still working under the impetus of the will,
the reason continues to compare the means
and in intellectualism presents a final prac-
tical judgment or command to the will. It
is: "Establish red and green lights." This
then becomes the act of the will. The will
cannot refuse this precept, yet the free will
plays a part in its formulation. The will
then decides on the establishment of "stop
on red and go on green lights" as the solu-
tion of that problem. A law is enacted,
which, in Thomist doctrines, is an act or
command of the reason following that elec-
tion of the will, and it says "stop on red
and go on green under such and such penal-
ties." However, in voluntarism the intellect
would present the four means, indicating
the advantages and disadvantages of each,
and the decision would be made by the will
itself. It is true that in Thomism reason
moves - moves people and faculties to an
end - and that moving is a will-act - yet
St. Thomas explains this by stating that
will and reason work together and that the
moving feature of the will-act continues in
the command of the reason. Those who
follow Suarez, who was a voluntarist, deny
any command of reason after the election
by the will - in the preceding case, "stop
on red and go on green." In voluntarism
the will gives the command and moves the
faculties to action. In St. Thomas, the rea-
son gives the command after the act of the
will however, since a command is "an
ordering of a subject to do something by
declaring something to him - and to order
this by declaring is an act of the reason." 6
This is also the work of law so that it fol-
lows that law is essentially a thing of rea-
son. "Ordering of actions to an end is
precisely the chief work of the law. We
have a perfect parallel between the work
of reason and of law, so that it follows that
law is essentially a thing of reason."'7 So
in St. Thomas there are two commands of
reason in lawmaking, one prior to the act
of the will, which determines what the will-
act will be and a second command after the
will-act which orders the subject to do
something.
Eternal Law
St. Thomas lists four kinds of law:
Eternal Law, Natural Law, Human Law
(which can be state or ecclesiastical), and
Divine (revealed) Law. When God brought
into existence the various creatures of the
universe He had to have an end for each
of them and had to direct them to their
ends. The name given to the law by which
God directs all His creatures to their ends
is the Eternal Law. As St. Thomas stated
it, God "governs all the acts and movements
in each single creature." The divine wisdom
as directing all actions and movements is
the Eternal Law.8 Inanimates, plants and
animals God directs through their natures
which lead them to acts suitable to their
natures and through these acts to their
ends. These creatures always attain their
ends since they are not free.
That part of the law of God (Eternal
Law) which directs men as rational, free
creatures is called the Natural Law. This
6 ld., I-1I, q. 17, art. 1.
7FARRELL, THE NATURAL LAW ACCORDING TO
ST. THOMAS AND SUAREZ 9 (1930).
8 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, i-11, q. 93, art. I.
is Natural Law as it is in the "legislator,"
as against Natural Law "in the subject."
The preceding is indicative of St. Thomas'
definition of the Natural Law. He says:
"The Natural Law is nothing else than the
rational creature's participation of the
Eternal Law." 9 This definition indicates
Natural Law as it is "in the subject."
St. Thomas says one "participates" a
law if he is ruled by that law. "A thing is
ruled as it partakes of the rule."'10 This
statement would be true of human law-
makers and their subjects. So to participate
the Eternal Law means to be ruled by it
- to have the law of God become a law
in man through an order or command in
man's head. Just as man's reason partici-
pates Divine Reason, his will participates
the Divine Will, and his existence the
Divine Existence, so this law in man is a
participation of God's law for him. St.
Thomas maintains that every law is de-
rived from the Eternal Law. He says:
"Since the Eternal Law is the plan of
government in the chief governor, all the
plans of government in the inferior gov-
ernors must be derived from the Eternal
Law. But these plans of inferior governors
are all the laws besides the Eternal Law."
11
God directs creatures to their ends
through the natures He has given them.
One can obtain the Scholastic teaching on
nature in Collingswood's The Philosophy
of Nature.'2 We find that beings in this
world exist in classes or species. They are
not merely individuals but individuals of a
particular class. We see that men too be-
long to a class or species, that they have
certain common acts and a specific nature
9 Id., I-II, q. 91, art. 2.
10 Ibid.
11 Id., I-I, q. 93, art. 3.
1 2 COLLINGSWOOD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
116 (1961).
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which is common to all men, and is the
source of those common acts.
This human nature embraces powers
which each and every man possesses and
retains permanently even though at cer-
tain times he may not be able to use them.
All men have the same specific powers or
faculties while at the same time they have
many other powers which are individual to
them and which vary greatly from person
to person. These individual powers are the
result of their particular heredity or en-
vironment or determinations of their own
free wills or combinations of these. If one
accepts the doctrine of forms, as do the
Scholastics, and holds that all men have in
them the same form, a rational soul, which
is the root source of their nature and of
their specific acts, the reason for the com-
mon human nature becomes clearer. Na-
tural Law examines man's specific natures
and gives universal laws- and does not
consider individual meh as such.
So God gives to each species, and so to
men, a nature or "inclinations," as St.
Thomas calls them, which are the same in
all men and which lead to certain acts
which in turn lead men to the end God had
in view for them. As indicated previously
the only object which can fill out or com-
plete the powers of human nature and give
man the happiness he craves is God Him-
self. From the inclinations impressed on
man by God, man's reason acquires the
Moral Law which is known as the Natural
Law since these inclinations indicate God's
Plan and Will for men. Those acts which
are in accord with man's inclinations will
lead him to his end and so are pronounced
good, and those acts which are opposed to
man's inclinations and lead him away from
his end are labeled bad. The Natural Law
orders the good ones to be done and the
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bad ones to be avoided. So the Natural Law
could be defined as a moral law obtained
and pronounced by reason from an analysis
of human nature.
St. Thomas states that man has three
sets of inclinations: ( 1 ) certain inclinations
in common with all other creatures (2) in-
clinations in common with other animals
(3) inclinations which are proper to him
as a rational creature. An example of the
first set is the inclination to continue in
existence, which is common to all crea-
tures. This leads to the moral precepts in
man concerning the preservation of life.
The second set considers generation and
the education of offspring and gives rise
to moral precepts on the generation and
education of children. The third set con-
siders the inclinations to attain the truth,
to live with our fellow men, to form a state,
etc., and gives rise to precepts on respect
for authority, the practice of justice, the
worship of God.
When we state that human nature is
the foundation of the Natural Law, we do
not mean merely a human nature in its
intrinsic constitution, in the relation of one
faculty to another, but human nature taken
completely, including its relation to God,
to other men and to animals, plants and
inanimates.
Three Classes of Precepts
The Natural Law may be said to com-
prise three classes of precepts: first - some
"primary" or very general principles which
are self-evident. Examples of these "pri-
mary" principles are: "Follow human na-
ture," "Attain your end," and "Good is to
be done and evil is to be avoided." The last
is St. Thomas' formulation. These precepts
are the same. Good here means what leads
to one's end or what is in accord with
human nature. What is in accord with hu-
man nature takes man to his end. All the
other precepts of the Natural Law flow
from or are conclusions of these first
principles.
The "secondary" precepts are derived
from the primary by easy reasoning. These
are known to practically all, even to the
uneducated, but can be missed by a few,
particularly in their application. Precepts
like: "Do unto others as you would have
others do unto you," "Don't murder,"
"Don't steal," belong to this class. The Ten
Commandments, with the exception of the
"Sabbath Day" part of the Third, are all
secondary precepts of the Natural Law as
known by reason- and they can be so
known.
The Remote Conclusions or "tertiary"
precepts (St. Thomas did not use the
expression "tertiary") are far removed
from the primary principles and are difficult
to learn. Although objectively certain also,
they are not known to ordinary people but
to those who are better trained in ethical
matters, to the "wise" as St. Thomas put
it. The Natural Law principles in certain
complex medical problems such as eutha-
nasia and ectopic gestation, in certain tax
and insurance cases and in hunger strikes
are "tertiary" precepts.
There is added reason why some men
do not comprehend the "tertiary" and at
times the "secondary" precepts and that is
"the interposition of emotions in the con-
sideration of conclusions." Hence, among
the reasons listed by St. Thomas for missing
the truth in these precepts are "concupis-
cence or some other passion," "evil persua-
sions," "vicious customs" and "corrupt
habits." Men are at times prejudiced and
don't want certain answers a priori since
such answers mean suffering and demand
a change in conduct. Men are inclined to
justify the activity which is pleasing to
them, especially if they have been engaging
in that activity. As someone has said: "If
you don't act as you think, you will ulti-
mately think as you act."
For Thomists none of the preceding pre-
cepts are "innate." They are all empirical
in some way. For example, before a man
concludes that in ordinary circumstances it
is wrong to kill his neighbor, but it is not
wrong for him to kill his cow or pig, he
must learn the nature of his neighbor and
the nature of these animals. That knowl-
edge begets the right and wrong.
It might be mentioned that these precepts
of the Natural Law concern acts which
necessarily lead to man's end and so are said
to be intrinsically good - such as worship-
ping God, honoring parents, respecting au-
thority - and acts which necessarily take
man away from his end and so are said to be
intrinsically bad - such as murdering, steal-
ing, blaspheming. Because these precepts of
the Natural Law concern acts which are
necessary means for man's attaining his end,
they beget in man an "obligation" to obey
them.
Conflict - Higher and Lower
At times, a conflict takes place among
the inclinations in man and the precepts
built on those inclinations - for instance,
when the same object will satisfy one appe-
tite or inclination of human nature and
impede or prevent the satisfaction of an-
other. In human nature there is a certain
order of higher and lower, a certain hier-
archy among man's faculties and inclina-
tions (each faculty has an inclination).
Man has the duty of keeping the higher
faculties and inclinations higher, and the
lower, lower; of preferring the higher to
the lower- of maintaining the order of
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faculties and inclinations established in
man by the Author of his nature. The
spiritual faculties of intellect and will, with
their corresponding inclinations, which are
wider in scope and deal with the universal,
the super-sensible and the spiritual, are
higher than sense faculties dealing with
proximate goals, with the individual and
the material.
Conclusion
Among the properties of Natural Law,
two are outstanding - its universality and
its immutability. It applies to all men and
it is unchangeable. Regarding the possibil-
ity of change, many have misunderstood
St. Thomas and have taught that the Nat-
ural Law can change or fail in some cases.
Now, in a number of places, St. Thomas
has taught that the Natural Law is immuta-
ble. For instance he says:
The Natural Law is a participation of the
Eternal Law and therefore endures without
change, owing to the unchangeableness and
perfection of the Divine Reason, the Author
of Nature. The Natural Law contains cer-
tain universal precepts which are everlast-
ing whereas human law contains certain
particular precepts according to various
emergencies.' 3
It is true that St. Thomas does use the
word "change" but not in its present-day
meaning. He says "a change in Natural
Law may be understood in two ways. First,
by way of addition . . ."14 (this would
occur if a state law would be made on
killing, for instance, by declaring mercy-
killing illegal and so adding to the law.
Nobody today would say that the addition
of a positive law "changes" the Natural
Law) and "secondly, a change in the nat-
ural law may be understood by way of sub-
13 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-I, q. 97, art. 1.
14 Id., I-fI, q. 94, art. 5.
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traction, so that what previously was
according to the natural law ceases to be
so. In this sense the natural law is alto-
gether unchangeable in its first principles:
but in its secondary principles, which are
certain detailed proximate conclusions
drawn from the first principles, the natural
law is not changed so that what it prescribes
be not wrong in most cases. But it may be
changed in some particular cases of rare
occurrence."15
The problem here concerns not a change
in knowledge but a change in the precept
itself. The case frequently mentioned is
that of the return of a deposit or some-
thing held in trust, an example used by St.
Thomas many times. "Deposits should be
returned" is a law of justice. If however
the deposit should be a gun and the deposi-
tor returns in a drunken or insane condition
or expects to use the gun for suicide or
murder, the gun should not be returned.
Some say there is here a change in the
Natural Law. The previous statement no
longer holds. The statement - "Deposits
should be returned" - supposes ordinary
conditions. Since most depositors would
return in this condition, that principle
would hold for most cases but it would
not cover a few, like those mentioned
above. St. Thomas indicates that the law
in all these cases of justice is unchangeable
when he says "the precepts of the Deca-
logue [which are Natural Law commands]
as to the essence of justice are immutable."
"Deposits should be returned" is an in-
complete and abbreviated expression of the
Natural Law on deposits. It is a formula
which, if understood absolutely, is incor-
rect- just as "Thou shalt not kill" taken
absolutely is an incorrect expression of
the Natural Law on the taking of human
1" Ibid."
life. When cases of lawful killing are met,
the Natural Law on taking human life does
not change.
Therefore, when St. Thomas speaks of
the law's changing, he refers to these abbre-
viated expressions. The well-known theo-
logian, Rev. Francis Connell, C.S.S.R.,
states on the preceding:
Frequently the mode of expressing the
natural law even by the Almighty in the
promulgation of the ten commandments is
abbreviated, so that the precise meaning can
be found only through a certain measure of
interpretation and expansion. Thou shalt not
kill would be expressed thus in its fullness:
'Thou shalt not kill directly an innocent
person, apart from a special divine authori-
zation.'16
St. Thomas and Thomist thinkers main-
tain that the Natural Law is not only intrin-
sically unchangeable but that it cannot be
changed extrinsically, i.e., by men or by
the Church or by God Himself through a
dispensation, if the word dispensation is
taken in a strict sense. St. Thomas says,
"God cannot dispense a man so that it be
lawful for him not to direct himself to God
or not to be subject to his justice, even in
those matters in which men are directed to
one another.' 7 He also states, "the pre-
cepts of the Decalogue admit of no dispen-
sation whatever."' 8 Instances of alleged
dispensations in Natural Law are not dis-
pensations in the strict sense. Thus when
God ordered Abraham to kill Isaac, He did
not dispense him from the Fifth Command-
ment since Abraham had been given by
God the right over Isaac's life whereas
murder is the killing by one who has not
the right of life over another.
16 CONNELL, OUTLINE OF MORAL THEOLOGY 31
(2d ed. 1958).
17 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-I, q. 100, art. 8.
I8 Ibid.
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